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This article discusses the claims made by some qualitative researchers that 
collaborative autoethnographic writing serves to displace sociology and other social 
sciences as a means to understand subjectivity.  Collaborative creative writing 
claims to be no less valid than sociological inquiry and is less socially exclusive, and 
academic criticism of this approach is itself seen as only subjective. A particular 
project by Wyatt and Gale and others can still be exposed to ‘immanent critique’, 
however, where the philosophical resources used to support the argument (the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari in this case) can be explored to suggest quite different 
implications for subjectivity. These include discussing external social influences on 
creativity and collaboration, and, more generally, on subjectivity itself. Guattari’s 
cartography of subjectification suggests that sociological inquiry, including the 
sociology of education, still has a major role in providing empirical examples and 
experiences of the processes involved, as resources for subsequent deleuzian 
philosophising and for effective micropolitics. 
Keywords: collaborative autoethnography, Deleuze, Gale, Guattari, 
subjectification, Wyatt
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Resumen 
Este artículo discute las afirmaciones hechas por algunos investigadores cualitativos 
de que la escritura autoetnográfica colaborativa sirve para desplazar a la sociología y 
otras ciencias sociales como un medio para comprender la subjetividad. La escritura 
creativa colaborativa afirma ser no menos válida que la investigación sociológica y 
es menos socialmente excluyente, y la crítica académica de este enfoque se 
considera solo subjetiva. Sin embargo, un proyecto particular de Wyatt y Gale y 
otros aún puede exponerse a la "crítica inmanente", donde los recursos filosóficos 
usados para apoyar el argumento (el trabajo de Deleuze y Guattari en este caso) 
pueden explorarse para sugerir implicaciones bastante diferentes para subjetividad. 
Esto incluye discutir las influencias sociales externas sobre la creatividad y la 
colaboración, y, de manera más general, sobre la subjetividad misma. La cartografía 
de subjetivización de Guattari sugiere que la investigación sociológica, incluida la 
sociología de la educación, todavía tiene un papel importante en la provisión de 
ejemplos empíricos y experiencias de los procesos involucrados, como recursos para 
la filosofización deleuziana posterior y para la micropolítica efectiva. 
Palabras clave: autoetnografía colaborativa, Deleuze, Gale, Guattari, 
subjetivación, Wyatt.
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mpirical sociology has been criticised from a number of positions 
based on various kinds of linguistic stances, including 
Wittgenstein’s linguistics, structural linguistics and conversation 
analysis. The common thread is that social science is redundant 
because its characteristic forms of research and theorising are misplaced and 
objectified. Ordinary language alone is perfectly capable of grasping the 
dynamics of social life. 
One of the later developments to make this sort of argument is 
autoethnography. Conventional ethnography was always developed as part 
of the methodological resources of sociology in uncovering the subjective 
dimensions of collective social life, especially if it researched ‘others’, 
outside the mainstream in some way. However, there have always been 
problems with the methodology and with the politics of ethnography, turning 
on that moment when subjective accounts of social life are transformed into 
sociological data. It is difficult to avoid power relations to impose meaning, 
or what Bourdieu (2000) called ‘symbolic violence’, at that point. One 
solution is not to transform the accounts that people give of their lives in that 
way, to work with unmediated life histories or other entirely subjective 
accounts.  
Postmodern philosophical critique of the claimed privilege of 
sociological concepts strengthened this trend. Short, Turner & Short (2013, 
p. 3) say that autoethnography emerged from ‘scepticism toward positivist-
informed “master” or “grand” narratives, which claim objectivity, authority 
and researcher neutrality in the study of social and cultural 
life...disinterested, “objective” instruction gives way to evocative, 
emotionally-resonant connection’. Unlike conventional ethnographic 
research, which can involve subsequent coding or external theoretical 
interpretation, autoethnographers have developed ‘new forms of subjectivist 
writing, which focus on the local and the particular... utilising creative 
written and analytical practices, including literary tropes’ (2013, p. 4).  
Autoethnography can offer commentary on academic discourse, usually 
through attempts to connect subjective accounts to theoretical issues, but still 
in an unmediated way, by the autoethnographers themselves. Thus personal 
experience of discrimination in the university might be linked to more 
general theoretical accounts of the formation of gender identity, as in many 
studies, including Gannon and Davies (2006), or attempts to see the 
E 
RISE – International Journal of Sociology of Education, 7(1) 27 
 
 
transformations of subjective aspects of university life can be seen as a result 
of ‘neoliberalism’. However, personal experience still retains its privileged 
position as the only kind of valid evidence of the personal effects of these 
policies.  
There might be no way to fully reconcile autoethnographic and 
sociological thought. There can be collaborative forms of autoethnography 
as we shall see, but understanding the other is no longer understood to be a 
sociological problem requiring any particular method: ordinary forms of 
interaction will resolve the difficulties, especially if participants are prepared 
to disclose fully their views and their feelings to each other.  
For enthusiasts, autoethnographic approaches ought increasingly to 
dominate research, especially of the effects of particular organisations and 
regimes on the subjective lives of participants, while conventional 
sociological research will eventually become redundant. This intention is 
perhaps clearest in Denzin’s (2017) recent contribution to the influential 
Handbook of Qualitative Research edited by Denzin & Lincoln: he invited 
the audience to declare that the very concept of data is now dead. 
Many of the arguments can be seen developed in other contributions to 
that Handbook. The work of Richardson is of particular relevance to this 
article in influencing the particular project that is to be discussed. 
Richardson suggests deploying more lively writing techniques derived from 
creative fiction or poetry, partly to engage readers by providing details about 
the normal lives of authors. ‘Form and content are inseparable’ (Richardson  
2000, p. 923): in ‘postmodernism’, the boundaries between ethnography, 
poetry and drama are blurred. Poetry especially can ‘recreate lived 
experience and evoke emotional responses’ (2000, p. 931). Social science 
already uses powerful metaphors. Since all these forms arise from ‘creative 
analytic practices’ they can all be considered as ‘CAP ethnography’ (2000, 
p. 929). 
 
Creative Writing in Richardson 
 
Richardson (2000) sees ‘creative writing’ as a qualitative research method, 
perhaps the only valid one. Writing is not just a matter of telling people 
about the social world, but is a form of knowing in itself, discovering ‘new 
aspects of our topic and our relationship to it’. We should now focus on the 
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creative and the analytic in autoethnographic writing to help the reader to 
share and ‘relive the events emotionally with the writers’ (2000, p. 931). 
Science writing is as conventional, as any other form, and scientific 
conventions should be rejected because ordinary speech is closer to poetry 
than scientific prose. No specific examples are offered to justify these 
substantial generalizations, however. 
The rules of conventional ethnography are seen as ‘arbitrary, narrow, 
exclusionary, distorting, and alienating’ (2000, p. 939), and this seems to be 
supported by personal experiences of early rejection of her own work. 
Minorities within academia will find this new approach welcoming, and 
increasing access will enrich and diversify the community of qualitative 
researchers. 
The writing should still display ‘coherence, verisimilitude, and interest’ 
(Richardson 2000, p.  931), partly because university autoethnographers 
have to assess student work, and this leads to a list of criteria (2000, p. 938), 
which includes ‘substantive contribution’; ‘aesthetic merit’ (including 
whether work is ‘artistically shaped and satisfying, complex and not 
boring’); ‘reflexivity’, showing an (uncritical?) awareness of the 
‘epistemology of postmodernism’. The list persists in a slightly different 
form in the latest version (Richardson & St Pierre, 2017). There should also 
be personal ‘impact’: ‘does this affect me?  Emotionally?  Intellectually?  
Does it generate new questions?  Move me to write?  Move me to try new 
research practices?  Move me to action?’  
Richardson (2000, p. 941) ends with some basic suggestions for 
developing more ‘creative writing’, which include developing ‘attentiveness 
to your senses...  as a bulwark against the censorious voice of science’.  
Autoethnographers should experiment with evocative writing in particular, 
for example by turning field notes into drama or a poem and exploring 
‘writing narratives of the self’ (2000, p. 942). Some of these techniques 
feature in the subsequent work of Wyatt et al.  
There are clearly problems with this argument, however, for example in a 
rather uncritical reliance on ‘postmodernism’ which tends to reduce all 
forms of writing to equivalents, regardless of intention or content. It is 
perfectly true that science writing can never escape completely from 
subjectivity, but that does not mean that it should follow the intention to 
‘recreate lived experiences and evoke emotional responses’, unless we are to 
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privilege those over other research goals, which will require justification. 
We are not guided in the case where other criteria might also contradict, 
where, say, ‘personal impact’ might be present despite the absence of any 
new discoveries about a topic. 
Personal impact seems to be particularly problematic since it runs the risk 
of becoming arbitrary and even dogmatic or authoritarian. It must be 
difficult to disagree with Richardson’s estimate of any personal impact on 
her specifically, at least without seeming to make personal criticism of her 
subjective reactions and judgments. This leads to a central problematic claim 
for the approach since it assumes that the sole source of knowledge about 
personal subjectivity is the person themselves, that there are no external 
determinants of subjectivity of which persons are unaware, no unconscious 
or socio-cultural elements for example, no awareness of how these might 
intrude on apparently purely personal knowledge or language, no role for 
any sociological or social philosophical analysis of these elements.  
 
External and Immanent Critique 
 
It is difficult to critique approaches which privilege personal subjectivity, 
however, since for postmodern relativists, any expert discourses claiming to 
identify external constraints on personal subjectivity can only be subjective 
themselves. Only the power of universities still preserves these privileged 
concepts (Gale & Wyatt 2018).  
There is no convincing reason why we should prefer, say, Bourdieu’s 
sociological critiques of universities to Richardson’s personal account: both 
are clearly subjective in the general sense. This abstract similarity seems 
sufficient to cancel any differences in content or intent. At worst, academic 
critique can be seen itself as a form of oppression or criticism as suggested 
above. Together, these two arguments can provide an almost impregnable 
defence, offering what Baudelot (in Bourdieu, Passeron & St Martin 1994, 
pp.88--9) once called ‘prophylactic relativism’, designed to forestall critique 
altogether: students argued that since there are no right answers, any 
suggestion that someone has written a wrong one can only be based on a 
hostile personal opinion. Perhaps that is why the writers considered here are 
often enthusiastically supported and reassured by other creative writers and 
autoethnographers in the same academic network, indignantly rallying to 
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defend them against unfair personal attack. 
Badley (2011, pp. 483—4) noticed the difficulties in his attempt at a 
critical review of Gale and Wyatt (2009): the book has been ‘praised as 
methodologically significant and pedagogically important…as beautiful, 
brilliant, evocative, erudite, original, profound and sensitive. A critical or 
nonaffirmative review may well be received as sour and curmudgeonly 
…perhaps reviews should eschew any criticism that is not affirmative’. 
Badley proposes to proceed instead as a ‘textor’, someone who works on the 
basis that any text is ‘both plural and multilogical’, so that it becomes 
possible to analyze a ‘textual score’, to see how a text reveals a writer’s 
voice. 
One similar critical option is what was once called ‘immanent critique’ in 
Critical Theory. The approach works with materials suggested to be relevant 
by the writers themselves. Neglected implications in these materials are then 
unpacked to reveal problems with the central argument after all. In this case, 
the work of Deleuze and Guattari  is cited as relevant by Richardson and St 
Pierre as well as Wyatt and Gale -- Richardson (Richardson & St Pierre 
2005, p. 965) refers to her own work as ‘rhizomatic’ and St Pierre describes 
Richardson as indicating a deleuzian ‘line of flight’ (2005, p.968). However, 
deleuzian work can then be discussed to suggest implications that are critical 
for the whole notion of personal subjectivity that informs the work.  These 
can suggest a role for sociology and other social sciences as well. 
Immanent critique does not completely demolish the case that all 
readings are subjective, but it shifts the ground in an important way to ask 
whether other readings are equally possible and, if so, how they might be 
compared, and what the grounds might be for preferring one. For example, a 
reading might be either corrigible or dogmatic, more open to critique or 
more defensive. Specifically, we can ask whether particular readings of 
Deleuze and Guattari have been selected to support the emphasis on personal 
subjectivity, and how alternative readings have been dealt with. If a focus on 
the personal does act in this defensive way, it is possible to see it as 
demonstrating a pathological form for Deleuze and Guattari, (for example 
Deleuze 1990) where subjectivity collapses into a ‘black hole’ incapable of 
forming any transversal links with other discourses or domains. 
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Wyatt and Gale and Collaborative Writing 
 
This article aims principally to examine how the work of Deleuze singly, but 
mostly that of Deleuze and Guattari together, has been used in support of a 
particular project of collaborative writing by Gale, Wyatt and others, 
especially in Gale & Wyatt (2009) and Wyatt, Gale, Gannon & Davies 
(2011a).  The project claims to be well established in universities, to have 
produced important published contributions to qualitative research, 
influenced teacher training, and become a model for ‘new and creative 
writing practices in the university of the future’ (Wyatt & Gale 2017, p. 3).  
Richardson and St Pierre on creative writing have had a major continuing 
influence on this project, but there is a special place for deleuzian work in 
Wyatt et al.:  ‘we wanted to bring Deleuze's concepts to life in our 
collaborating bodies and our unfolding engagements with life in its 
specificity – and in its Being’ (Wyatt, J., Gale, K., Gannon, S., Davies, B., 
Denzin, N., & St. Pierre, E. 2014 , p. 3): ‘We look to Deleuze for our 
primary ways of knowing’ (Gale & Wyatt  2009, p. 29).  Their collaborative 
writing was continually justified by relating it to the collaborations between 
Deleuze and Guattari and the creative effects this produced.  
The actual substance of the writings initially covered conventional 
autoethnographic interests in subjectivity, emotions and feelings, with the 
writing seen as a distinct method to access these. Perhaps the best example is 
Wyatt, Gale, Russell, Pelias & Spry (2011b, p. 253): ‘We offer stories of 
how writing touches and how it writes bodies into being and in between, 
returning to love and intimacy as scholarly, messy, complex methodology’ . 
Substantial emotional labour seems to have been required to sustain this 
project, and it collapsed. In Gale, Pelias, Russell, Spry & Wyatt (2013, pp. 
9–10), one of the participants refers to:  
 
the guilt associated with not doing our agreed upon task as we would 
have liked, with not being the people we strived to be within our 
group...meaning to write back with sensitivity and insight...I did not 
like the weight of it all. I did not like myself...Perhaps it was feeling 
we were not sufficiently taken up, that our writing was left hanging, 
ignored, or addressed in only a perfunctory manner. We felt slighted, 
hurt. 
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Less emotionally demanding and more abstract methodological issues are 
prominent in the later works.  
Throughout, the writing is attributed to characters like ‘Ken’, ‘Jonathan’ 
and others.  Despite sharing names, the characters are not to be seen as 
authentic representations of the authors: ‘we make no argument – at all—
that we are in search of “authenticity”’ (Wyatt & Gale 2011, p. 494).  The 
writings themselves are therefore best described, perhaps, as what Denzin 
calls ‘truthful fictions’ (Wyatt et al. 2014), although again this makes it 
difficult to assess them critically. 
 The contention here is that this project involves selective reading and 
quoting of deleuzian work, not as a sign of scholarly inadequacy compared 
to some ‘true’ account, but as a consequence of the privilege accorded to 
personal subjectivity. This restricts interest and leads to insufficient 
exploration of the arguments that surround the deleuzian concepts cited in 
support of the claims about collaborative writing. 
 
Reading Deleuze and Guattari Subjectively 
 
The interest in immediate and personal subjectivity seems to have influenced 
the way in which Deleuze and Guattari have been read. To refer back to 
Richardson, if there are no substantial differences between genres of writing, 
and if the main aim of good writing is to liberate emotions in the reader, it 
becomes possible to read deleuzian work in a particular way.  Gale & Wyatt 
(2009, p. 45) describe reading Deleuze & Guattari (2004):   
 
Sometimes I read passages that I have read a hundred times before, 
indulging in the poetry of the writing and finding pleasures in the 
unusual tropes... and, on other occasions, often quite absent-mindedly, 
I will lift [a book] from its resting place... open the pages at random 
and find myself being taken to new heights of intimacy, enjoying 
pleasures that I hadn’t dreamed of.  
 
This approach is contrasted with its rhetorical opposite, a ‘desire to 
define, to express the all-embracing denotative utterance, [which] can have 
pre-occupying effects; the need to colonize meaning becomes obsessive’ 
(Gale & Wyatt 2009 , p. 3). This binary seems to exhaust the possibilities. 
Other sections refer to reading deleuzian works using a technique where a 
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character ‘pulled out more quotes from Deleuze’ (Wyatt et al. 2011a, p.43) 
using unspecified criteria for selection. Quotes are common throughout the 
work, largely from Deleuze & Guattari (2004) at first but also from Deleuze 
& Parnet (1987). It is not clear why these volumes have been chosen for 
particular attention, though, unless it is because these are both collaborative 
works.   
It is impossible to justify adequately the argument here, with no room for 
extended textual references, but none of the quotes seem to raise problems 
for the basic approach. They seem to be always taken as immediately 
relevant to and supportive of the focus on personal subjectivity. As perhaps 
the clearest example, Wyatt et al. (2011a, p. 26) supply additions in square 
brackets to a quote from Deleuze & Parnet (1987) which makes the character 
‘Deleuze’ seem to contribute directly to their specific project: ‘What 
mattered was not the points—[Ken, Bronwyn, Susanne, Jonathan]—who 
functioned simply as temporary, transitory and evanescent points of 
subjectivation—but the collection of bifurcating, divergent and muddled 
lines, which constituted this [writing] as a multiplicity’.    
It can be seen that this quote actually follows from a discussion of how 
Dialogues ‘aims to highlight the existence and actions of multiplicities in 
very different domains…[to focus on] the formations of the 
unconscious…literary, scientific and political formations’ (1987, pp. viii-ix), 
which describes quite a different, explicitly philosophical, project ranging 
across a wide range of academic interests.   
In (Gale & Wyatt 2017, p. 25) the problem of making quotes relevant to 
their project on personal or interpersonal subjectivity seems to have been 
transcended altogether:  
 
to ‘quote’ him [Deleuze] is to do disservice to him. He is already 
present in our words, in these bodies writing, in these material spaces, 
in the morning light that catches the edge of a kitchen table, as we 
grasp for what might be possible, what might be opened up, what 
might become-other, for where working at the wonder might take us. 
 
This poetic approach seems to have led to the omission of many topics in 
Deleuze & Guattari (2004). Many of the Plateaus are not mentioned, 
including the ones on freudian analysis, linguistic regimes, State apparatuses 
of capture, the novella, micropolitics, faciality and the refrain, all important 
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for discussing subjectivity and the external influences on it.  
Denzin noticed the unusual focus of the Wyatt et al. readings. He had 
apparently studied Deleuze and Guattari in a student reading group which 
had emphasised the themes of capitalism and schizophrenia , and he notes 
that Wyatt et al. (2011a) said ‘very little, if anything...  about politics, 
madness, or capitalism’ (Wyatt et al. 2014, p. 6).  Denzin raises, but does not 
pursue, the important issue of how different readings might be compared: 
‘Whose genealogy shall I follow?’ In the absence of any possibility of 
shared criteria for choice, this seems to leave only opportunism. 
 One possible justification for the particular approach to reading Deleuze 
and Guattari might be found in St Pierre (2004, p. 289) discussing a 
metaphor coined by Virginia Woolf, involving a dog running along a road, 
cited in the section on haecceity in Plateau 10 of Deleuze & Guattari  (2004, 
p. 290). In a much-cited phrase, for example in Wyatt and Gale (2014), St 
Pierre says the metaphor ‘made sense to me. I got it, or, rather, I plugged it 
(however one makes sense of it) into my own musings about subjectivity 
and it worked’. ‘Plugging in’ in Deleuze & Guattari (2004, pp 4—5) seems 
to originate in discussions of desiring machines rather than subjective 
individuals, however, and can be seen to imply a machinic understanding of 
writing: ‘A book itself is a little machine... when one writes the only 
question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into, 
must be plugged into in order to work…Literature is an assemblage’. This 
machinic conception is discussed below. 
Even in personal and subjective terms, much will depend on whether the 
metaphor leads to an exploration of deleuzian concepts or just to a moment 
of confirmation of existing knowledge. St Pierre herself does indeed 
subsequently explore the implications in a more critical and systematic 
direction than do Wyatt and Gale. She says their project must still retain the 
notion of the humanist subject, ‘the intentional writer...  The author’ (Wyatt 
et al., 2014, p. 8).  More generally: ‘We can’t just drop a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
concept … which brings along with it their entire transcendental empiricism 
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Reading Badiou Subjectively 
 
There is a particularly unfortunate consequence of subjective reading in this 
final example.  In specifically academic writing, it is common to summarize 
the positions of others accurately and at some length, perhaps in the form of 
‘indirect discourse’, before critiquing them. This practice is not always 
found in normal discourse, and can be missed if the two discourses are made 
abstractly equivalent. Badiou is about the only critic of Deleuze discussed in 
the whole project, but he is not explored (Wyatt et al. 2011a, p. 132).  
Badiou (2000, p.9) is quoted, offering examples of different images of 
Deleuze (I have abridged the actual quote): 
 
There is an image of Deleuze as... vitalist and democratic.  It is fairly 
commonly believed that his doctrine promotes the heterogeneous 
multiplicity of desires and encourages their unrestrained realization...  
That he preserved the rights of the body...  constantly commended the 
Open and movement, advocating and experimentation without pre 
established norms...  It is equally believed that he participates in 
modern (postmodern?) "Deconstruction"   
 
However, the next section, beginning on the next page, is not quoted or 
discussed.  No reason for the omission is given, but it looks as if it is only 
the first section that supports the interests of the collaborators. Badiou (2000, 
p. 10) actually goes on to reject these images, as an introduction to the rest 
of his book:   
 
…let us also remind those who naively celebrate a Deleuze for whom 
everything is event, surprise and creation that the multiplicity of "what 
occurs" is but a misleading surface…  All those who believe that 
Deleuze's remarks may be seen to encourage autonomy or the 
anarchizing ideal of the sovereign individual populating the Earth with 
the production of his/her desires are no less mistaken…  [The 
machinic conception of desire]...  strictly precludes any idea of 
ourselves as being, at any time, the source of what we think or do....  
[and], contrary to all egalitarian and all "communitarian" norms, 
Deleuze's conception of thought is profoundly aristocratic.  
 
Many other examples of selectivity might be signposted for additional 
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discussion. The writers concerned claim that their work can be understood as 
a ‘line of flight’, but the actual discussion in Deleuze and Guattari (2004) 
shows that lines of flight can take different forms – absolute and relative, for 
example. Pursuing this issue would lead to the discussion of creativity as 
arising from the dynamics of the multiplicity, not just in personal forms. 
There is also a politics of lines of flight, and how they are resisted. This 
would add an important ‘external’ dimension to purely personal efforts. It 
would be especially interesting to discuss the politics of their own work, 
which began facing considerable resistance from conventional university 
authorities (Gale, Speedy &Wyatt 2010) but seems to have ended as a well-
established academic enclave after all, strengthening, possibly, the business 
model of the university as a humane and creative institution offering therapy 
to overcome the strains of academic life. 
 
External Dimensions of Subjectivity in Creative Writing 
 
Continuing the immanent critique by choosing areas that Wyatt et al. pursue 
themselves, there is a great deal of discussion of fictional literature and some 
poetry in deleuzian work, but it is barely mentioned in Wyatt et al.. 
Discussion seems to follow a rather different project than the one suggested 
in Richardson. Instead of adding colour and emotional resonance to 
academic accounts, suitable fiction is to be read ‘clinically’, as a source of 
experience that is just as relevant for philosophy as direct communications 
between individuals. Deleuze  (1997) has a whole set of essays showing how 
this can be done.  
The chosen novellas in Deleuze and Guattari (2004) illustrate the most 
commonly available ‘lines of subjectivity’ in our society, for example. One 
prominent example of poetry cited by Deleuze and Guattari (2004), a work 
by Ghérasim Luca, recounts all the routine events that were taking place at 
the same time as the funeral of one of his friends. The discussion does not 
prioritise the emotions associated with bereavement, but sees the poem as 
demonstrating the ‘haecceity’, the contingent and nonsubjective 
conjunctions of heterogeneous events producing individuations (often 
thought of as  ‘accidents’). This is a concept that leads in turn into the whole 
issue of ‘the event’, of heterogenous assemblies, of processes of 
actualization of the virtual. 
RISE – International Journal of Sociology of Education, 7(1) 37 
 
 
Clearly it is beyond the scope of this article to pursue the discussions of 
literature very far, but we might focus on the example of Proust’s work, 
extensively discussed in a number of deleuzian commentaries, including  
Deleuze (2008). This is the subject of an excellent commentary by Bogue 
(2008) stressing its relevance for deleuzian pedagogy. Proust’s work is often 
seen as an exploration of subjective memory, but Deleuze wants to argue 
that it is really a philosophical inquiry into the operation of time itself, 
including its ability to determine subjective memories and perceptions, but 
these insights emerge only as Proust develops his own writing technique. 
This begins ‘as an extended apprenticeship in the explication of signs’ 
(Bogue 2008, p. 1), what Bourdieu (1996, p. 201) calls an ethnography, as 
Proust and/or his narrator (Proust writes in the names of himself and his 
narrator) begin to investigate the rather exotic subcultures in Paris from 
which they are initially excluded. These include the elite circles associated 
with various Parisian salons, and homosexual networks for both men and 
women. 
As his project develops, Proust increasingly displays a ‘machinic’ writing 
technique. This moves away from the subjective perspectives of the 
participants to offer more analysis of the impersonal forces shaping their 
lives and identities, including historical and social change. More specific 
techniques include using what might be called ‘artificial narratives’ based on 
some nonsubjective device: perhaps the most convenient example concerns a 
section where Proust/the narrator uses a train journey to structure his 
recollections of past events, with each station visited serving as a prompt. 
Deleuze also describes Proust’s work as exhibiting a ‘body without organs’ 
as he discusses different ways to perceive human faces, for example, and 
that would have been a useful example for Wyatt and Gale: ‘Jonathan’ notes 
that: ‘What I have not addressed in this piece, but which I am aware of at 
this moment, is how... the process of writing to you, now, here, is (or is not?) 
contributing to...our BwO’ (Gale & Wyatt, 2009, p. 154) 
Creative writers seem to have no interest in avant-garde forms in 
collaborative creative writing, possibly except for a preference for ‘free-
form’ poetry. The artistic avant-garde is important for Deleuze, however, in 
breaking out of the constraints of ordinary language, and this gives it a 
political as well as a philosophical significance. We might find demonstrated 
here a difference in taste, understood by Bourdieu to reflect class position, of 
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course: those not in elite groups tend to immediately reject avant-garde work 
as an affront to common sense, to be greeted with ‘confusion, sometimes 
almost a sort of panic mingled with revolt’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 33).  Perhaps 
critical philosophy has to be restrained in the interests of social inclusivity in 
creative writing? 
Gale & Wyatt (2009, p. 16) cite Deleuze & Parnet (1987, p.1) to say that 
‘writing is a question of becoming’. However, Deleuze also adds ‘there are 
very few who can call themselves writers’ (p. 6). This is because writers 
with philosophical intents have to learn definite techniques to break with 
common-sense linguistic and social constraints. They do this by consciously 
developing technical analysis, ‘calculated sobriety in relation to the disparate 
elements and the parameters’ (Deleuze & Guattari  2004, p. 440),  for ‘there 
is no imagination outside of technique’ (2004, p. 380).   
By contrast, ordinary language draws upon an unreflected  ‘common-
sense’ , which consists of an image of thought that operates with flawed 
processes of recognition and repetition (Deleuze 2004, especially chapter 3). 
‘Normal’ concepts seem infinitely extendable and self-sufficient and are not 
open to rigorous self-correction. As with Bourdieu’s (2000) notion of the 
habitus, much ordinary thinking is grounded in unthinking habit. Human 
beings are particularly unlikely to be aware of these processes and 
defenceless against them (Deleuze 2004, p. 190). In a phrase which many 
pedagogues would recognise, common sense involves ‘extrapolation from 
certain facts, particularly insignificant facts…  Everyday banality’ (2004, p. 
171). Guattari makes a similar case based on various Marxist traditions. His 
argument, in, for example, Guattari (1995) demonstrates the dangerous 
harmony between common notions of subjectivity and the systems of 
‘Integrated World Capitalism’. 
Deleuze’s earlier work argued that far from developing loving, caring 
relationships with individuals in a warm and supportive academic 
community, we have to abandon the idea of transparency and good will 
(including the view that the world itself offers some good will towards our 
efforts to understand it). Philosophy actually requires an ‘individual of ill 
will’ (2004, p. 166), someone who sees subjective presuppositions as 
prejudices, refuses to go along with convention as ‘a wise idiot’, and remains 
critical of current popular thought. 
We see some possible problems with ordinary language where ‘Ken’ 
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records his apparently entirely subjective impressions as he walks through 
Cornwall (UK) (Wyatt et al 2011a). He ‘can't help seeing old fishermen 
everywhere, devout preachers walking from the chapels, and girls in heavy 
long skirts sorting fish on the quayside’. However, these remarks seem to be 
fully compatible with the ‘romantic gaze’ already generated by the tourist 
industry. Bennett (2000, p. 112) notes that paintings of the Cornish Newlyn 
School, like Women sharing fish (Gotch 1891), which features women in 
heavy long skirts sorting fish, but on a beach rather than a quayside, were 
‘particularly apparent with regard to poster production where the imagery of 
the fishing communities was widely adopted’. The posters display ‘a strong 
representational if romanticised style in the depiction of simple, dignified 
working people’.  
 
External Dimensions of Subjectivity in Collaboration ‘Between the 
Two’ 
 
A central claim by Wyatt et al. is that caring and supportive collaborative 
work, will offer particularly insightful forms of creativity, and this is based 
on some of Deleuze’s comments on his productive collaborations with 
Guattari, cited in Stivale (2003) and Dosse (2011). Deleuze & Parnet (1987, 
p.x) describe the relationship with Guattari: ‘What was important for us was 
less our working together than this strange fact of working between the two 
of us.  We stopped being "author".  And these "between-the-twos" referred 
back to other people’. 
Wyatt and Gale also use the term ‘between the two’ to describe their own 
work, although they offer only a limited discussion of what they might mean 
by it and of the circumstances in which it might particularly generate 
creative writing. For example, the ‘other people’ referred to in Deleuze’s 
words clearly refer to other writers, of fiction and philosophy, as well as 
immediate colleagues, which seems to imply that direct contemporaneous 
correspondence between living contributors is not essential. Deleuze’s 
substantial solo-authored books particularly show the importance of 
creatively reading the earlier work of others as a prelude to creative writing 
of one’s own. 
Forms of collaboration also seem to have varied between Deleuze and his 
colleagues. Stivale thinks the collaboration with Parnet was initially rather 
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like Deleuze’s pedagogic technique in lectures, with Deleuze initially 
discoursing at length and uninterrupted, until Parnet was able to understand 
his position. Then she was encouraged to ask critical questions about it.  
The pattern of collaboration varied even with Guattari. Deleuze & 
Guattari (1984) saw Deleuze requiring Guattari to submit written expositions 
of his favourite concepts, partly to overcome Guattari’s writer’s block, with 
Deleuze making subsequent comments. They focused on theoretical issues, 
especially the critiques of Freud and Lacan that pervade the book. The 
success of this collaboration lay in their use of ‘everything that made them 
different’ (Dosse 2011, pp. 6-7), in their encounters with Lacan for 
example.  There was little dialogue when they did meet:  when the other 
spoke, they listened intently and silently. They took care to try to understand 
what the other had said and come to some agreement, trying to make each 
other’s ideas work, perhaps to produce academic indirect discourse: it is not 
clear that any mutual therapy was on the agenda. That produced ‘a true 
"work machine" that made it impossible to know who wrote what precisely’ 
(Dosse  2011, p. 9).  
The writing of Deleuze & Guattari (2004)  seemed different, however -- 
both felt more comfortable, and the topics were prompted more on current 
cultural events and experiences, a choice to move away from a formal 
philosophical style. The results are both impressive in scope and difficult to 
follow.  However, the possibility arises of yet another nonpersonal 
contributor to creativity here in the form of the highly productive Parisian 
elite education and academic habitus (Bourdieu 2000, p.145) that both 
writers shared and that produces exactly the sort of effortless application of 
categories and distinctions in erudite discussions that characterise the book.  
The ferment of critical ideas circulating as a result of the Events of May 
1968 must also have played a part. 
It is also the case that work conditions were highly conducive. Neither 
writer was constrained by university conventions: Deleuze seems to have 
enjoyed almost total autonomy as a distinguished professor. As Wyatt et al 
well know, that is not the case these days, and Wyatt et al (2017) note the 
increasing attempts to regulate collaborative academic writing at least at 
certain early stages in a career. Wyatt and Gale required some astute 
micropolitical manoeuvring with the aid of their supervisor (Gale et al. 
2010) to proceed to present a collaborative thesis, for example. Micropolitics 
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seems an ever-present aspect of collaboration, even there is some 
institutional autonomy: ‘In these conditions, as soon as there is this type of 
multiplicity, there is politics, micropolitics’, even with friendly collaborators 
(Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p. x). 
 
Guattari and the Cartography of Subjectivity 
 
Gannon (2006) argued that the autoethnographic self is actually a partial 
manifestation of subjectivity, embodying only the modern humanist rational 
self, attempting to know and thus heal itself, as a kind of therapy. This is 
certainly detectable in the work of Wyatt et al., even at the level of their 
writing practices, which often seem to begin with moments of what would 
nowadays be called ‘mindfulness’ before proceeding to supportive 
exchanges of emails. 
Gannon hints both at other possible forms of subjectivity  and at the 
social and historical processes that install current ones. For Guattari 
especially, there are pathological forms, for example, like those constrained 
in the interests of social repression, as we saw. Subjectivity can also end in a 
narcissistic ‘black hole’ where everything revolves around personal concerns 
and personal schema.  Examples here include socially isolating behaviour, 
from the nervous breakdowns and ‘crack ups’ of  writers, artists and 
philosophers noted in Deleuze (1990) to those institutionalised obsessives 
and paranoids Guattari encountered in his psychiatric clinic.  
All the forms should be seen as contingent variations of underlying 
processes of subjectification and their complex interconnections. Guattari 
(2013) aims to ‘metamodel’ subjectivity, to be able to explain each form as a 
procedure to make sense. There are personal, social and material processes 
generating affects of all kinds (not just emotions but perceptions, cognitions, 
whole points of view) whether we are normally aware of them or not. This 
explains the dominance of the Unconscious, which is not just the freudian 
collection of infantile memories which have been repressed, but also the 
habitual, and the affects from unrecognized material determinants.  Personal 
awareness rarely taps this Unconscious in practice. 
For Guattari, there are non-human aspects, ‘machines of subjectivation’ 
(Guattari 1995, p.  9), operating in ‘a-signifying semiological dimensions’ 
(1995, p. 4), which cannot be understood using conventional semiology.  It 
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is a mistake to prioritise ‘natural language’, as does autoethnography, 
especially if this excludes these and other affects.   
(Guattari, 2013) attempts further systematization and clarification, 
unfortunately at the expense of being almost impenetrably detailed and 
technical. For Guattari there are four autonomous, heterogeneous but 
interconnected domains of the Unconscious. Sociologists might immediately 
recognise the domain of ‘incorporeal universes’, as including those elements 
which are normally called cultural, the systems of meanings developed in 
literature, art, music, philosophy, science and technology which pre-exist 
particular individuals but still influence them.  There are also ‘existential 
territories’, the second domain, which include animal territories and natural 
milieux or neighbourhoods, as well as personal lifeworlds, and these feature 
pragmatic interests and actions, but still within frameworks of determinants. 
In the third domain we encounter autonomous ‘flows’. These can be 
material forces, with direct affects on bodies: Guattari talks of the important 
psychosomatic affects of bodies on mood and perception rather than any 
mystical ‘agency’ of the nonhuman world. If flows are semiotized they can 
affect the domain of incorporeal universes as well. The fourth domain is that 
of ‘machinic phyla’, where a machine is a particular combination of 
intensive, non-empirical forces and elements and a phylum describes a 
structured grouping of machines. Phyla can develop autonomous processes 
of self-positing and self-development, purely machinic possibilities, 
including ‘phase transitions’, at an abstract level.  The machinic phyla are 
important because they provide a particular potential for possibilities that are 
not yet realized, that exist outside current human discourse, that are implicit 
or immanent. As Guattari (1995, p. 37) puts it: machines have a ‘dimension 
of alterity’, a radical potential arising from being able to be joined to (even 
‘plugged into’) other machines in a ‘“non-human” enunciation’. These 
potentials can be exploited after phyla transmit affects to human domains via 
‘[non-subjective] tensors of [cognitive] surplus value of the possible’ 
(Guattari 2013, p.  55). We have already seen some of the creative potentials 
of writing machines, but other examples include military technology or 
metalworking (a particular contribution of the nomads celebrated in Deleuze 
& Guattari 2004). It is also possible to see theoretical or philosophical 
systems, including sociological ones, as machinic in the same way. 
Overall, it would be hard to overestimate the importance of machinic 
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developments on contemporary subjectivity, Guattari insists, especially with 
the advances in communication technology. He saw much potential in the 
early ‘Free Radio’ movements in France for example, and it would be 
interesting to consider the growth of the Web or of social media in this 
context.  
Trying to develop a subjectivity that speaks in its own right constantly 
risks being dominated by the ‘otherness of society’ (Guattari 2015, p. 107). 
The answer is to retain ‘maximum communication among different levels 
[and domains] and, above all, in different meanings’. Guattari calls this 
‘transversality’. This is necessary to help us become open to a world beyond 
immediate interests, to develop perspectives, and make enunciations of our 
own.  
 It is particularly important to develop ‘a decisive re-examination’ of 
institutional truths (Guattari 2015, p. 113), and this would include those of 
the education system.  In staying analytic, we also need to resist the 
‘besotting mythology of “togetherness”’ (p. 118), perhaps including that 
close emotional solidarity among autoethnographers.  Otherwise, groups 
also become dependent on consensus (and constant social reinforcement of it 
in meetings or conferences) and eventually aim only at self preservation to 
‘magically protect themselves from a non-sense’ (p. 119).  They become 
‘subjected groups’. Inevitably, there is an anxiety-producing consequence of 
groups pursuing transversal communication in that they might have to come 
to realize they are mistaken. They must pursue transversal and critical 
inquiries nevertheless, and, in freudian terms, must ‘put themselves in the 




Subjectivity is never just a matter of awareness, existing only in our 
individual consciousnesses. There are clearly external and social elements – 
our past culture, creative techniques including machines of various kinds, the 
habitus and organizational contexts which affect our efforts.  
The emergence of subjective enunciations has to be mapped in each case, 
and this requires analysis, provided by specialist groups or by individuals. 
This clearly leaves a role for social science. Neither Deleuze nor Guattari are 
totally hostile to social science, and indeed draw freely upon ethnographic 
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studies, for example. They also tend to rely on cultural marxism. Their 
critique follows from a denial of the sufficiency of social sciences, which 
suffer from the ‘objective illusion’ (DeLanda 2002) that the empirical world 
is the only reality that exists. The empirical results of social science thus 
have to be the subject of further ‘transcendental’ philosophising to develop 
the task of describing the virtual world which is immanent to the actual one. 
Sociological analysis has an important role in tracing some of the links 
between the domains which are only sketched as arrows in Guattari’s 
diagrams. The links between existential territories and incorporeal universes 
require transmission mechanisms, for example, which clearly include the 
education system and the mass media. These transmission mechanisms 
might produce uneven effects, both accommodation and resistance, and 
‘micro acts of resistance, refusal and sabotage’, even in the university 
(Roggero 2011, p. 76).  
Suitable forms of sociological analysis, at the micro level especially, 
would have intrinsic merit in checking the abstractions and tendencies to 
over-generalisation about ‘neoliberalism’ including those found in 
autoethnographic work. Instead, they might help inform the development of 
the micropolitics that Deleuze & Guattari (2004, Plateau Nine), say is crucial 
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